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ABSTRACT 
Properties of the strongly decisive sets (some preference 
for x over y along with no preference for y over x allows coalitional 
enforcement of x over y) associated with a social decision function 
are investigated. The collection of such sets does not have the 
superset preserving property of filters, but is characterized by 
properties defining a target. A 1-1 and onto mapping is exhibited 
between the class of targets and a certain class of social decision 
functions, showing that such functions are completely characterized by 
the structure of their strongly decisive sets. The " ring" structure 
of targets is shown to be closely related to known results on veto 
hierarchies. 
SOCIAL DECISION FUNCTIONS AND STRONGLY DECISIVE SETS* 
Edward W. Packel 
1. Introduction 
Several recent papers have developed partial or complete 
characterizations of classes of social decision functions in terms of 
constructs based upon the associated collections of decisive sets. 
Hansson (1976) interpreted Arrow's impossibility theorem in terms of 
the associated ultrafilter of decisive sets. Brown (1973) extended 
this correspondence to the case of acyclic choice functions and 
prefilters. To deal with the multiplicity of social decision functions 
having the same collection of decisive sets, Brown restricted the 
class of social decision functions while Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) 
and Blau and Brown (1980) added structure to the collections of decisive 
sets, and thereby obtained a characterization of certain social decision 
functions. 
In this paper we investigate properties of what we call the 
strongly decisive sets associated with a social decision function. Such 
sets must be able to enforce alternative x over alternative y as long 
as no one in the set prefers y to x (indifference is allowed) and 
someone prefers x to y. We show in Section 3, Theorem 1 that the 
collection of strongly decisive sets form what we call a target, a 
collection of subsets of the voter set N totally ordered by inclusion 
*The author wishes to thank Professor John A. Ferejohn for providing 
motivation and valuable suggestions. 
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(see Figure 1). While targets do not have the superset preserving 
property exhibited by prefilters, they nonetheless reveal interesting 
structural information about social decision functions. We show that 
the rings of the target form a ratification hierarchy. This hierarchy 
coincides with the notion of a lexicographic dictatorship (Fishburn, 
1975) when the social preference is transitive (Theorem 2) and is 
generally analogous but not identical to the idea of a veto or oligarchy 
hierarchy (Blau and Deb, 1977), 
Figure 1 - A TARGET OF VOTER SUBSETS AND ITS RINGS 
Target {c1,c2,c3,c4,N} 
Center = c1
ith ring = Ci
\ Ci-l 
(i=2, 3,4, 5) 
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In Section 4 we characterize the set C of social decision 
functions that arise naturally from targets. Theorem 4 shows that C 
must satisfy the strong Pareto property, a form of neutrality, a new 
and somewhat technical property which we call unilaterality, and social 
preference quasitransitivity. Theorem 5 then establishes a 1-1 
correspondence between C and the class of targets over the voter set. 
The approach of this paper most closely parallels Brown (1973), while 
treating essentially the opposite extreme case where indifference tends 
to be treated as support. 
2. Definitions and Terminology 
We assume a finite population N of voters with !NI = n. 
Let A with !Al � 3 be any set of alternatives under consideration. In 
discussing the preference relations of voters and of society over the 
alternatives, we will generally use the (�trong) asymmetric preference 
(�), from which the (weak) preference or indifference (R) and the
indifference (I) relations can be deduced in standard fashion. The 
following classes of relations will be needed: 
B 
R 
{asymmetric binary relations on A}. 
{P £ Bl the R arising from P is transitive}, (transitive preferences). 
Q = {P £Bl P is transitive}, (quasitrartsitive preferences).
n Given a profile TI =  (P1, P2, . .. ,Pn) £ R describing the voter's
individual preferences and given x, y £ A, we define 
[xPy] = {i £ NixPiy}
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and similarly for [xRy] and [xiy]. A soeial decision function is a 
function F : Rn+ B, so for each profile TI£ R
n, F(TI) is the asymmetric
preference relation describing society's preference. We occasionally 
use P in place of F(TI) with R and I denoting, respectively, society' s
weak preference and indifference. To simplify the notation, we 
likewise denote the social preference corresponding to a profile TI' 
by P', with R' and I' playing their expe.cted roles.
We now list some. standard conditions which F may be required 
to satisfy. We streamline these definitions by giving them all the 
following common quantifiers: 
Vx, y, x' , y' £A, VTI, n' £Rn
IIA (Independence): [xRy] [xR' y], [xPy] [xP' y], and 
xF(TI)y =O> xF(n' )y; 
NEU (Neutrality): [xRy] = [x'Ry' ], [xPy] = [x' Py' ], and 
xF(TI)y ='> x' F(TI)y' ; 
MON (Monotonicity): [xRy] _=. [xR' y], [xPy] c [xP' y], and 
xF(TI)y � xF(TI' )y; 
P (Pareto): [xPy] = N ='> xF(TI)y; 
SP (Strong Pareto): [xRy] = N and [xPy] � 0 =O> xF(TI)y;
UII (Indifference invariance): [xiy] = N =O> xiy; 
URR (Weak preference invariance): [xRy] = N � xRy. 
A more general form of monotonicity (neutrality) which incorporates 
neutrality (independence) is often given, but it will be convenient for 
our purposes to keep these separate. There are obvious connections 
among the above properties. Thus MON =l> IIA, NEU =I> UII1 SP =!> P, 
and (SP and UII) =!> URR. 
Given F : Rn + B, its decisive sets W(F} are defined by
W(F) =· {C �NI [xPy] � C =l> xF(TI)y}.
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The focus of what follows will be on the strongly decisive sets V(F): 
V(F) {c c N, c f 0 I c c [xRy] and c n [xPy] f 0 =l> xF(TI)y}.- -
3. Targets artd'Voter Hietatchies
Anticipating the structure of the strongly decisive sets 
N V(F), we call a collection V � 2 a target if
i) N E V and 0 i V
ii) c1, c2 E V =l> c1 � c2 or c2 � c1.
Theorem 1: F : Rn + B and SP =l> V(�) is a target.
Proof: i) N E V(F) by property SP and 0 i V(F) by the definition
of V(F). 
ii) Given cl, c2 E V(F), suppose neither cl.::. c2 nor
c2 � c1 holds.
Pick distinct x, y EA and any TI E Rn such that [xPy] = c1 \ c2,
[yPx] = c2 \ c1, and [xly] = (Cl n c2) U (N \(Cl U c2)). Then
c1 E V(F) =l> xF(TI)y, and c2 E V(F) =l> yF(rr)x, contradicting the




We now present several examples for purposes of illustration 
and subsequent use. 
Example 1: Let F be simple majority rule. Then V(F) 
W(F) = {c c NI lcl > n/2}. 
{N}, while 
Example 2: Let V be a specific subset of N with lvl � 2 which acts
as an oligarchy in controlling the social decision as follows: 
xF(TI)y ._ . [xPy] � V or ([xRy] = N and [xPy] >! -) • 
Again V(F) = {N}, while W(F) = {c �Nie_:: V}, the filter generated by V. 
Example 3: Let the alternative set X be totally ordered by a total
order relation >. Pick c1, c2, c3 so that 0 # c1 # c2 # c3 = N and




{[xRy] _:: Ci and [xPy] n 
[xly] = N and x > y. 
Ci f 0 (i
{cl,c2,N}, while W(F) = {C �Nie.::: Cl}.
1,2, or 3) 
Example 4 :  Given 0 � c1 ¥ c2 � c3 = N, define
xF(TI)y ._ [xRy] _::: Ci and [xPy] n Ci 'I 0 (i = 1 or 2).
Then V(F) = {c1,c2} (not a target since F is not SP) and
W(F) = {C .::_Nie_::: c1} . 
Returning to a general F : Rn + B which is SP, we can order
the sets {ci}�=l in the target V(F) so that 0 j c1 f c2 f . . .  f Cs
S. Now define the collection {R,}. 1 of disjoint sets by 
l i= 
1 {c1 if i
Ri = Ci\ Ci-l if 2 :::_ i :::_ s.
We refer to the sets Ri as the tings of the target. The ordered
partition {R. }� 1 of N can be thought of as a ratification hierarchyl i= 
in the following sense: as long as some member of R 1 prefers x to y
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N. 
and none are opposed, we have xF(TI)y; if i > 1 and members of R. for all 
J 
j < i are indifferent, then the members of Ri can force xF(TI)y in the
same fashion as just described for R1. We now make some observations
relating these Jldeas to established results in social choice theory. The 
lexicographic dJlctatorship result of Fishburn (1975) leads directly to: 
Theorem 2: Given F : Rn + B satisfying SP, UII, and IIA, then range (F) c R 
� I Ril = l for each ring Ri of the target V(F).
Proof: =l> : This implication is proved in Fishburn (1975) and is 
closely related to Arrow's proof of his impossibility theorem. 
<= Given TI E Rn, xRy, and yRz (societal weak preference),
we must Bhow that xRz. If xRy is, more specifically, xiy, then we 
must have [xiy] = N since otherwise the first i (l :::_ i :::_ n) such that
Ri = {j} and -xijy would determine a strict social preference (this is
a consequence of IR. I = l \1 i). In this xiy case, [yRz] = [xRz] andl 
[yPz] = [xPz], from which xRz follows (UII is needed here in some cases). 
A similar argument holds if yRz results from yiz. We now consider the 
final case where xPy and yPz (strict societal preferences). Let 
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q be the first ring subscript such that R = {r} and xP y and let kq r 
be the first ring subscript such that �
exist by UII). Let i = min {q,k} and Ri
{m} and yP z (such subscriptsm 
{j}. Since individual 
preferences are in R, we have xipz \fp E: Rt(t < i) and xPjz. If follows
from the definition of V(F) and IR I = 1 for all rings that xPz. Hence 
xRz and F(TI) E R, Since TI E Rn was arbitrary, range (F) c R.
Q.E.D. 
If we are given range (F) 5_ Q_, it is well known (assuming
IIA and P) that there will be an oligarchy V which can force a social 
decision by unanimous strong preference of its members. Furthermore, 
each member of V has a veto (i E V  and xPiy =l> -yF(TI)x) and V 
Blau and Deb (1977) develop the idea of a veto hierarchy, and 
n c. 
CsW(F) 
Theorem 2 gives a rather restrictive set of conditions (range (F) 5_ R,
SP, UII, and IIA) under which the veto and ratification hierarchies 
coincide. Example 2 shows that these hierarchies cannot generally be 
expected to coincide. The most that we can expect is that the first 
round vetoers v1 are a subset of the first ring R1 (i.e. the center
of the target) of the ratification hierarchy. The characterization of 
the next section will provide another special setting in which the two 
hierarchies coincide. 
4. Characterization Theorem
Given a target V � 2N, it induces for any TI E  Rn a natural
social preference F(V)(rr) by means of the following definition: 
xF(V)(rr)y �3C Ev, cc [xRy] and c n [xPy] # 0 . 
We would like to characterize those social decision functions which 
arise from targets in the manner defined above. Since different 
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functions can have identical targets (compare Examples 1 and 2) we will
need to restrict the class of functions considered. Our final social 
choice function condition requires the following definitions. 
Given F : Rn + B, a subset M of voters is called minimal
- n winning for x ove!-Y (written M E M (F}) if 3rr s R such that _. x,y 
i) [xiyJ M and xF(n)y;
n - -ii) (Vrr' E R ) [xR'y] � M, [xP'y] � [xPy], and [xI1y] c [xiy] =i> -xF(rr')y.
Any 7T which "works" in the above definition is called a minimal winning 
profile for M relative to x arid y, The natural interpretation of the 
definition should clarify it. We will have M E M (F) precisely whenx, y 
the cast of supporting and indifferent voters equals M and can effect 
a social preference for x over y in such a manner that any defection 
(:yPix) by members of M will destroy the societal preference for x
over y. In our Example 1, M (F) = W(F) V x 1 y; while in Example 4, x,y 
M (F) = V(F) V x 1 y.x, y 
We say that F : Rn + B satisfies unilaterality (UL) if
(Vx,yEA) (VM EM (F)), [xRy] :i M and [xPy] n M # 0 =» F(rr)y. Thisx, y -
condition thus says that on a set in M (F), any voter canx, y 
unilaterally force xF(7r)y as long as no other voters in the set prefer 
y to x (they may all be indifferent). 
The class of social decision functions we now consider is 
defined by 
c {F : Rn + BI F is SP, NEU, and UL}.
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Theorem 3: Let V be a target and F(V) its induced social decision 
function, Then 
i) F(V) E C 
ii) Range (F(V)) 5:_ Q
Proof: i) The fact that F(V)(rr) is asymmetric follows readily from 
the definition of F(V) and property ii) of targets. Since N E V, 
SP is immediate. Condition NEU results from the uniform way that any 
pair x, y E A  is treated in the definition of xF(V)(rr)y. Finally, 
given ME M (F(V)) by virtue of a minimal winning profile 7T, wex,y 
then have [xRy] =M and xF(V)(TI)y. By definition of xF(V)(TI)y, there 
must be some C E V such that [xRy] = M _:: C and [xPy] n C 1 0. By
minimality of M, we have M c C and we conclude that M = C E V and, 
in particular, the conclusion of UL is satisfied. 
ii) Suppose xF(V) (rr)y and yF(V) (rr)z. Then 3c, C' E V with
C c [xRy], C n [xPy] # 0 and C' � [yRz], C' n [yPz] # 0. Assume
without loss of generality that C � C'. Then C � [xRz] since each
Pi making up 7r has transitive Ri' Also, xPiy and yRiz for some
i E C from which it follows by transitivity of Ri that xPiz. Hence
C n [xPz] # 0 and xF(V)(rr)z follows. Thus F(V)(rr) E Q. 
Q. E. D. 
The properties SP, NEU, and UL making up the definition of 
C can be seen to be independent (no two imply the third) by looking 
at Examples 2, 3, 4, where, respectively, only UL, NEU, and SP are
lacking, In each case range (F) � Q. The following lemma will be useful
in examining some consequences of UL· and in our final characterization. 
n n 
Minimality Lemma. Given F : R -+ B and Tr € R with xF(Tr)y, 
JM c [xRy] 1 M € M (F). Furthermore, any 1T E: Rn with [xR y]- x,y 
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M and 
[xPy] = [xPy] n M is a minimal winning profile for M relative to x and y. 
Proof: Define M = {C 2_ [xRy]J JTr' €Rn 1 [xR'y] = C, [xP'y] = [xPy] n C,
and xF(Tr')y}. Since M is nonempty ([xRy] € M )  and finite, M ,has a 
minimal element with respect to th e partial order c. Let ME: M be such 
a minimal element with Tr any associated profile as prescribed in the 
definition of M .  Then M € M (F) and Tl is a minimal winning profile x,y 
for M relative to x and y, 
Q. E.D. 
The next result establishes some connections among UL and 
some of the other conditions that F R
n
-+ B may satisfy. It also 
shows that functions in C must have quasitransitive range values. 
Theorem 4: Given F : R
n 
-+ B 
i) SP, UII, and UL� MON and IIA 
ii) SP, NEU, and UL� Range (F) 2_ Q, MON and IIA 
Proof: i) Given [xRy] c [xR'y], [xPy] ,:=. [xP'y], and xF(Tr)y, apply 
the Minimality Lemma to obtain M c [xRy] with M € M (F) and a - x,y 
Tr £ R
n 
with [xR y] = M and [xP y] = [xPy] n M, a minimal winning profile. 
By SP and UII, [xPy] n M # 0 (otherwise we violate SP when M � N and 
UII when M = N). Noting that [xR'y] ,:::_M and [xP'y] n M j 0 and 
invoking UL, we conclude that F satisfies MON and hence IIA. 
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ii) We first note that the hypothes,es of i) above hold since 
NEU =!> UII. Thus we immediately h ave that F satisfies both MON and 
IIA. By using IIA and th en NEU repeatedly it can be sh own that for 
all x f y and z f w, M (F) = M (F} (:we omit the details). Now x,y z,w 
given xF(Tr)y and yF(Tr)z, use the Minimality Lemma to obtain 
M1 £ M (F) and M2 £ M CF). From the remarks above and UL we have x,y y,z 
M (F) = M (F) = V(F). Thus M1 and M2 are in V(F) and we can x,y y,z 
assume by Theorem 1, with out loss of generality, th at M1 ,'.::_ M2. Now 
xF(Tr)z follows precisely as it did in Theorem 3,ii). Thus range (F) ,'.::_ Q. 
Q.E.D. 
It is seen from these results that C implicitly requires 
much more than its definition states. We have attempted to define C 
as "weakly" as possible for the characterization which follows. 
Letting T denote the class of all targets from N, we have a map from 
social decision functions in C to targets in T (Theorem 1) and a return 
path from T to C (Theorem 3,i). 
Theorem 5: The mapping V C -+ T is 1-1 and onto with inverse 
F : T-+ C. 
Proof: We will show that V D € T , V(F(D)) = D, and that Vf € C, 
F(V(f)) f. Given a target D with C € D, we have C € V(F(D)) since 
[xRy] ,:::_ C and [xPy] n C # 0 � xF(D) (Tr)y. Thus V(F(D)) ,:::_ D. Conversely, 
if Cs V(F(D)), we know that C is strongly decisive for F(D), from 
which it follows that 
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[xRy] C and [xPy] n Cf 0 =1> xF(D)(�}y. (_1) 
Let C' be the largest proper subset of C such that C' e: D (if no such 
C' exists, take C' 0). Choose distinct x', y' e: A and a TI' e: Rn 
such that [x'R'y'] C and [x'P'y'] n Cf 0 (hence x'F(D)(TI1)y1 by 
(1)) and [x'P'y'J n C1 = 0. Then we must have C e: D since no other 
C' e: D will give us x'F(D)(TI')y', Thus we have shown that V(F(D)) 
D V D e: T. For the reverse composition, consider any f e: C and 
suppose xF(V(f)) (TI)y. Then 3 C e: V(f) 3 C .s:_ [xRy] and C n [xPy] -/. 0 . 
It follows from the definition of C e: V(f) that xf(TI)y, and we have 
shown that xF(V(f))(TI)y � xf(TI)y. Conversely, given xf(TI)y, apply 
- n 
the Minimality Lemma to obtain M c [xRy] with M e: M (f) and a TI E R - x,y 
with [xRy] = M and [xPy] a [xPy] n M. As in the proof of Theorem 4,i, 
we must have [xPy] n M f 0 and Me: V(F). Since M.=_ [xRy] we have 
xF(V(f)) (TI)y. Thus xF(V(f))(TI)y - xf(TI)y, showing that 
F(V(f)) = fV f e: C. 
Q. E.D. 
We have now characterized through social decision function 
axioms on C the ratification hierarchy process discussed earlier. 
The highly powerful central committee R
1 
considers pairs of alternatives 
on a consensus basis. We interpret this to mean that consensus of 
x over y occurs as long as no one in R
1 
prefers y to x and someone 
prefers x to y, If such a consensus occurs, then the central committee 
forces the whole population to choose x over y. If everyone in Rl is 
indifferent between x and y, the second ring R2 may pick up the ball, 
operating as does �· on a consensus basis. The process continues and 
can, in the unlikely case of massive indifference, filter all the way 
down to the outer ring R
s
' If we add that societal preferences can 
only arise in the above consensus fashion, Theorem 5 shows that the 
above general procedure is the ortly example of a social decision 
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function in C. Thus the strongly decisive sets of an f e: C completely 
determine f and the associated veto and ratification hierarchies 
coincide. 
5. Concluding CoiiuiJ.ents 
One major consequence of considering strongly decisive sets 
rather than decisive ones (�.e. unanimity is required on the set) is 
that supersets of strongly decisive sets need not remain so. This 
fact allows for more variety in the class of possible targets and 
makes possible our rather unstructured characterization. 
Some, but not all, of what we have done carries over to 
cases where N is infinite. One obstacle occurs in the proof of the 
Minimality Lemma where w e  call for a minimal element of a finite set. 
If the set becomes infinite, some added structure may be needed for a 
full characterization and Zorn's lemma might have to be invoked. 
Note that omission or weakening of the rather severe UL 
condition would broaden the class of social decision functions from 
C to a considerably larger class C' in w hich many functions would
correspond to each possible target. A less concrete approach to 
characterization would be to define an equivalence relation on C' by
F - FI - v (F) = v (FI) • Theorem 5 then shows that each equivalence 
class in C' contains precisely one member of C. Thus there is a natural 
social decision function satisfying UL associated with any function in C'. 
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Recalling that the proof of Theorem 1 only used asymmetry and 
condition SP on F E: C to show that V(F) is a target, we see that the 
procedure of the last paragraph can be carried out for even larger 
classes of social decision functions. The ultimate claim is then that 
there is a natural function in C associated with any asymmetric (not 
necessarily transitive) preference function satisfying SP. 
The connections among IIA, NEU, MON, SP, UII, and range 
(F) .::_ Q have less impact because of the use of the restrictive UL 
property. While there are neater results such as (range (F) _::_ Q, 
SP, and IIA) = MON and NEU (see Guha (J972) and Blau (1 976)), it is 
of some interest that implications from SP and UII to MON and from 
SP and NEU to range (F) ::_ Q are provided here. 
We conclude by observing that our approach essentially 
treats indifference as support (as long as some other member in the 
ring provides support). This is at the extreme from the "decisive set" 
approach, where indifference essentially becomes opposition. This 
observation suggests a variety of possible intermediate notions 
obtainable by placing cardinality conditions on the set [xPy]. The 
social decision procedures so considered would appear to be meaningful 
and worthwhile for the added decisiveness they provide. 
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